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PAVLA MILLER*
While demography has made many valuable contributions to the analysis of contem-
porary demographic reversals, the discipline seems as far as ever from explaining
the dynamics of fertility change. Commentaries on “populations” routinely link fer-
tility control and small families with progress, modernity, and western values; in
“traditional” societies, fertility regulation is left to chance, God, and custom. How-
ever, countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy, which score relatively
high on various indicators of “tradition”, have recently registered fertility rates far
below the level of their more “advanced” neighbours. The same appears to be true
of Italian immigrants in Australia. Italians are often depicted as traditional people
recently confronted by modernity and painfully coming to terms with its liberating
potential. In conducting detailed studies of specific communities, however, anthro-
pologists, historians, and other scholars provide what are arguably more empiri-
cally accurate explanations of procreative behaviour: ones based on discontinuities,
alternative strategies, mutual dependencies and exploitations, and diverse rational-
ities and traditions, cultures, and economies.
Si la démographie a maintes fois et largement contribué à l’analyse des renverse-
ments démographiques contemporains, la discipline ne semble pas plus en mesure
que jamais d’expliquer la dynamique de l’évolution de la fécondité. Les commen-
taires sur les « populations » associent régulièrement le contrôle des naissances et
les petites familles au progrès, à la modernité et aux valeurs occidentales. Dans les
sociétés « traditionnelles », le contrôle des naissances est laissé à la chance, à Dieu
ainsi qu’aux us et coutumes. Cependant, des pays tels que l’Espagne, le Portugal, la
Grèce et l’Italie, qui obtiennent des notes relativement élevées aux divers indica-
teurs de la « tradition », ont récemment enregistré des taux de fécondité bien
inférieurs à ceux de leurs voisins « avancés ». Il semble en aller de même pour les
immigrants italiens en Australie. Les Italiens sont souvent dépeints comme des gens
traditionnels s’étant récemment éveillés à la modernité et composant douloureuse-
ment avec son potentiel libérateur. Cependant, la réalisation d’études détaillées de
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certaines communautés par les anthropologues, les historiens et d’autres cher-
cheurs fournit des explications, que d’aucuns qualifieront de plus empiriques, du
comportement procréateur fondées sur des discontinuités, des stratégies de
rechange, les dépendances et les exploitations mutuelles et diverses raisons, tradi-
tions, cultures et économies.
Were a modern couple, we have no need for children.... Any idiot can have
children, but its better to have none.1
What kind of society cannot even reproduce itself? The answer is our form of
free market society.2
[T]otal fertility rates of about 1.3 in Central Europe ... are a sign of social
pathology that would seem to call for energetic countermeasures.3
FEMINISTS and others have for many years argued that women do not
exist as a self-evident category, let alone all have the same interests and
political agendas, as many believed in the 1970s. Are there, then, some other
groupings that make sense? How would one theorize such phenomena? How
do the identifying practices of social science and public administration inter-
act with social solidarities? This is not merely a taxonomic question: if femi-
nists want to formulate viable social policies and win political struggles,
they need to have a shrewd assessment of the circumstances, needs, solidari-
ties, and divisions of their constituencies.
This discussion grows out of my previous work on historical transforma-
tions of patriarchy and my more recent curiosity about contemporary gender
regimes.4 I approached the larger question of contemporary gender regimes
by focusing on some aspects of the bearing and raising of children, and began
by examining one group  people of Italian descent  routinely identified
as distinct by commentators both in Australia and internationally. I chose
Italians because they constitute one of the largest ethnic groups in Australia,
and because I have a basic understanding of standard Italian. While I have
taken great care to be accurate, I make no claim to be an Italian scholar, a
1 East Prussian landlord, early 1900s, quoted in P. R. Galloway et al., Fertility Decline in Prussia,
Population Studies, vol. 48 (1994), p. 135.
2 P. McDonald, Institutional Support for Australian Families (paper presented to the Centenary of
Federation Seminar Series, Parliament House, Canberra, October 4, 2000).
3 P. Demeny, Pro-natalist Policies in Low-fertility Countries: Patterns, Performance, and Prospects,
in K. Davis et al., eds, Below-replacement Fertility in Industrial Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), p. 341.
4 My book Transformations of Patriarchy in the West, 1500–1900 (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1998), as well as theorizations of gender regimes in journals such as Social Politics, are part of
broad-based attempts to get away from essentialist notions of gender relations, not least by theorizing
different historical forms of male-dominated social orders, with different articulations of gender, age,
and class relations.
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demographer, or a statistician  or to map out comprehensive overviews of
the literatures I use.
In one of the most frequently debated passages of his work, Michel Fou-
cault claimed that the spread of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century
would not have been possible without the invention of new ways of control-
ling people. New technologies of production could not prevail without new
technologies of the body and of populations; industrial and population think-
ing had a lot in common.5 Australia, one of the white colonial settlements
established on expropriated indigenous lands, from the very beginning con-
fronted the accumulation of men in an even more fundamental way. Set-
tlers, convicts, officials, and troops needed to be shipped halfway around the
world, financed, fed, selected, policed, allocated. Indigenous peoples needed
to be conquered, imagined to fit into a western legal framework, rendered
useful. As viable settler communities were established, desirable immi-
grants needed to be attracted and unwanted ones kept out. In a nation of
immigrants concerned with adequate and appropriate population size, both
immigration and natural increase have remained on the political agenda;
competing understandings of (differential) fertility rates continue to play a
significant role in public policy.
Recently, Foucauldian analyses of population thinking became one of the
key departure points for new theoretical concerns with constitution of the
social.6 The social pertains to a knowable population; it refers both to a ter-
rain of intervention and a form of rationality. Demography supplies some of
the key coordinates of such knowledge. As other contributors to this collec-
tion note, it both distills influential understandings of its subject matter and
creates new ones. In its promise to supply facts, demography helps map
the social. In its attempts to explain and to predict the dynamics of popula-
tion increase, demography has the potential to allow us to grasp the funda-
mental principles of the lawful physiognomy of the social organism.
This is a significant and remarkably ambitious promise. If fulfilled, it
could link the most intimate of human sentiments and practices with the
most lofty matters of state, the most private with the most public concerns. It
could elucidate why gender relations and the family appear to be in crisis.
Sex, love, marriage, birthing, and the nurture of babies could be articulated
with taxation, education, employment and immigration policy, debates about
national character, even superpower politics and global sustainability. If
there are few babies and many old people, a shrinking number of the eco-
nomically active might need to be taxed more to support an ever-growing
population of the elderly. If immigrants supplement a shrinking native-born
population, established understandings of national character, with all their
attendant privileges and exclusions, might need to be rethought. If peoples of
5 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin, 1979), pp. 220221.
6 See, for example, D. G. Horn, Social Bodies: Science, Reproduction and Italian Modernity (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
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the developing world continue to grow and those of the wealthiest countries
diminish in numbers, demands for world redistribution of power and
resources are likely to intensify. If demographers discovered what causes
babies, Foucaults bold vision would reach a hitherto unattainable level of
perfection.
Demography is rarely seen as such an exciting site of social productivity,
not least because fertility trends stubbornly resist understanding. As one
prominent demographer put it, [T]he precipitous decline of Italian fertility
was a surprise to demographers, and it remains inadequately explained.
According to another, [T]he fertility decline started around 1965, almost
simultaneously in every country, and took everyone by surprise.7 While at
times, such as in debates about the Third World population bomb, demog-
raphers have played an influential role in public policy, their more widely
accepted role is to supply facts for others to interpret.8 For many purposes, of
course, this distinction does not matter. As Poovey notes, attempts to describe
inevitably involve attempts to constitute; both contribute to productivity of
particular notions of the social.
What follows is a reflective piece relevant to considerations both of the
social and of gender regimes. It focuses on the way notions of tradition and
modernity have been employed in explanations of fertility among Italians in
Italy and Australia. In this complex terrain, one issue stands out. Commen-
taries on populations routinely link fertility control and small families with
progress, modernity, and western values. In traditional societies, the
Malthusian calculus hardly applies and fertility regulation is left to chance,
God, and custom. In contrast, the modern man, the ideal social unit, exerts
rational control over his animal passions, defers gratification, plans for the
future, has a clear notion of self-interest yet finds worth and dignity in civic
duties, has a proud sense of history but is not shackled by outmoded tradi-
tion. Guided by his foresight though herself lacking in rationality, overflow-
ing with altruism but unfit for public office, emancipated yet feminine, his
wife has just the right number of children.
The problem is that some combinations of these sterling qualities seem to
reduce fertility to undesirable levels, or even eliminate the need for children
altogether. For over a century, the most exemplary members of the profes-
sional classes have been castigated for having too few offspring, those cap-
tive to tradition for breeding like rabbits. The most modern women, it seems,
break the shackles of patriarchal tradition and lifelong reproduction, leave
behind altruism for the individual pursuit of happiness, enter the paid work
force, and make pregnancy the subject of deliberation. Scrutinizing their
7 J.-C. Chesnais, Fertility, Family, and Social Policy in Contemporary Western Europe, Population
and Development Review, vol. 22, no. 4 (1996), p. 736; J. Bourgeois-Pichat, The Unprecedented
Shortage of Births in Europe in Davis et al., eds., Below-replacement Fertility, p. 5.
8 P. Demeny, Social Science and Population Policy, Population and Development Review, vol. 14,
no. 3 (1988), pp. 451479.
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options, the rational choice theories, which have become increasingly prom-
inent in fertility research in the last 20 years, seem at a loss to explain why
anyone under current circumstances would have any children at all in the
absence of significant pro-natalist incentives, save from miscalculation.9 To
complicate things further, countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and
Italy, which score relatively high on various indicators of tradition, have
recently registered fertility rates far below the level of their more advanced
neighbours. The same appears to be true of Italian immigrants in Australia.
In 1995 the total fertility rate in Italy, at around 1.17, was among the low-
est in the word (the notional replacement level is 2.1). If the rate remained at
this level for a century and there was no immigration, the population of Italy
would drop to 14 per cent of its initial size. In Australia, the fertility rate of
women of Italian origin was below that of most other ethnic groups and, at
around 1.5, approximated that of Italy.10 In both cases, higher than average
twentieth-century fertility rates have recently given way to very low ones.
While some demographers see this as an interesting coincidence,11 others
believe the parallel findings are due to the distinctive cultural traits of Italian
families. Initially, scholars attempted to attribute what they saw as the dis-
tinct behaviour of Italians to belated modernization. For an influential group
of contemporary demographers, in contrast, Mediterranean women in gen-
eral and Italian women in particular have fewer children because that is the
only practical way of maintaining traditional values in a modern world.
Modernization Theory
The above sketch derives much of its logic from modernization theory, a par-
ticularly influential late-twentieth-century form of population thinking. In
1973 Dean Tipps summarized the current state of modernization theory and
its critiques.12 In what is often referred to as a seminal article, he concluded
that modernization theory failed the test of telling us more about our subject
than any other categorical sets and should be abandoned. Modernization
theory emerged in its present form in the United States following the Second
World War, as a new generation of scholars embarked on study of societies
for which there was no local tradition of inquiry. In the climate of the Cold
War, Tipps noted, modernization theory provided an intellectual map which
felt intuitively correct and promised useful purchase on significant policy
issues. In this, it resembled the popularity of other theories justifying asym-
9 D. Friedman et al., Theories of the Value of Children: A New Approach in R. Leete, ed., Dynamics
of Values in Fertility Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
10 P. F. McDonald, Gender Equity, Social Institutions and the Future of Fertility (Canberra: Research
School of Social Sciences, Working Papers in Demography, Australian National University, 1997), p.
7.
11 S.-E. Khoo and J. Shu, Immigrant Family Formation Patterns in Australia (Canberra: Department of
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1996), p. 8.
12 D. Tipps, Modernisation Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective,
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 15, no. 2 (1973), pp. 199226.
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metrical relationships between societies during the heyday of European colo-
nialism. Written 30 years ago, Tippss arguments continue to be relevant to
literature on migration and fertility, in which Italians are often depicted as tra-
ditional people recently confronted by modernity and painfully coming to
terms with its liberating potential.
Tipps distinguishes between two versions of modernization theory. One
uses a measure of social change, such as urbanization or industrialization, as
an indicator of modernization; the other conceptualizes modernization as a
dichotomous process of transformation from traditional to modern societies.
Summarizing critiques of this latter approach, Tipps distinguishes between
three levels of argument. First, modernization theories are the product of an
ethnocentric world view: there are many similarities with accounts of bar-
barity giving way to civilization. Modernity is superior to tradition, and
the progress of nations continues to be evaluated by their proximity to west-
ern, Anglo-American values and institutions. Far from being a universally
applicable schema for the study of the historical development of human soci-
eties, Tipps concludes, the nature of modernisation theory reflects a partic-
ular phase in the development of a single society, that of the United States.13
The second form of critique refers to the erroneous empirical content of
modernization theories. Since the notion of tradition was formulated not
upon the basis of observation but rather as a hypothetical antithesis of
modernity, traditional societies were assumed to have been static, with no
history before the commencement of modernization upon contact with the
west. Moreover, a vast range of societies in different regions and different
times were thrown together in the category traditional merely on the basis
of not being modern industrial societies. This has made it difficult to chart
alternative paths to modernization or to analyse and acknowledge the fact
that some forms of contact between regions or societies inhibit moderniza-
tion. It also makes it difficult to analyse the interplay between different
forms of modernity and tradition within one society.
The final form of critique concerns methodological issues. Here, Tipps
notes that the very comprehensiveness of modernization theory makes it dif-
ficult to pinpoint precisely what it is expected to explain. This is in part
because the units of comparison are not identical. On the modern side, there
are national territorial states; on the traditional side, civilizations, culture
areas, empires, kingdoms, and tribes. More importantly, the theory is flawed
at its heart because it assumes in the first place what it needs to demonstrate
empirically: that there indeed is a process of continuous, progressive human
evolution, comprehensible by means of a single scientific concept.
Critiques such as these have undermined the academic respectability of
modernization theory. Yet, judging by the aims of a recent volume on the
cultural turn in social sciences, little has changed. The editors consider that
13 Ibid., p. 211.
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one of the key contributions of the collection consists of a shared opposition
to a view of national culture as timeless tradition, internally coherent and
shared equally by all members of the society:
The notion of a universal historical trajectory is made explicit within social
evolutionary and modernization theory; traditional Marxism, and systems the-
ory; it is usually implicit wherever the terms traditional and modern are used
without a specific chronological reference. Past cultural forms that fit poorly
with modern rationality are lumped together in the category of tradition;
and where the traditional cultures are contemporaneous, space is recorded as
time.14
Whatever the case, more than two decades after Tippss paper was pub-
lished, Greenhalgh noted that those outside demography continue to be
struck  as I was  by the pervasiveness of modernization theory within the
discipline.15 Her often-quoted article places emphasis on two key empirical
assumptions. For my purposes, both constitute useful points of departure in
commenting on Italians and demographic regimes. The first is that the histo-
ries of specific places are sufficiently alike to warrant theorizing them as
moving at uneven pace along a linear and universal progression from tradi-
tional to modern societies. It follows that to consider regional and class
variation is to abandon parsimony, elegance, and universality of explanation
and to encumber the theory with colourful but irrelevant detail. The second
assumption is that advanced societies and those which lag behind can be
studied in isolation from each other, because their modernity or lack of it can
be attributed to them alone. In other words, internal factors are deemed so
methodologically important that even relatively intangible processes, such as
the effect of schedules of breastfeeding on character formation, are worthy of
study, but external factors, such as the balance of trade or mutual dependen-
cies between countries, are deemed irrelevant. Importantly, Greenhalgh notes
that, as a measure of a nations progress toward modernity, the status of
women assumes particular importance. Western women, the argument goes,
are the least oppressed by their menfolk, the most rational, the most self-pos-
sessed, the most in control of their bodies. It follows that modernization (and
capitalism as its main driving force) are good for women, in spite of opposi-
tion from many traditional females.16
14 G. Steinmetz, Introduction: Culture and the State in G. Steinmetz, ed., State/Culture: State Forma-
tion After the Cultural Turn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 21.
15 S. Greenhalgh, The Social Construction of Population Science: An Intellectual, Institutional, and
Political History of Twentieth Century Demography, Comparative Studies in Society and History,
vol. 38, no. 1 (1996), p. 27.
16 Much of early feminist writing contained parallel assumptions regarding foreign countries and
social groups. Such claims have become the object of extensive contestation, in sites ranging from
international fora to remote village birth control clinics. See, for example, S. Corrêa, Population and
Reproductive Rights: Feminist Perspectives From the South (London: Zed Books, 1994).
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Greenhalghs notes on gender are complemented by Scotts critique of the
continuing influence of modernization theory within development studies. In
her book, Scott takes up many of the points made by Tipps. Her distinct con-
tribution is in showing how modernization theorists, who say almost nothing
explicit about women, associate modernity and progress with men and mas-
culinity, and tradition and barriers to modernity with women and the femi-
nine. In doing so, they take up many of the gendered assumptions of
particular forms of psychoanalytic theorizing.17
Family Size and Italians
Families of populations with similar family sizes may resemble one another in
no other attribute. Family size is not a proxy for the way that families operate,
or the way their members think: it is merely the characteristic of the family
that demographers are most interested in, and the one with which [demogra-
phers] are best equipped to deal.18
Demographic transitions (or changes between high and low fertility regimes)
have been theorized in a number of ways. One of the dominant models, well
represented in the work of Tilly, revolves around a shift from social con-
straint to individual regulation, a move from a society in which well-
defined collective needs explain group-to-group variations in fertility while
individual differences are matters of chance, impulse, and inclination, to a
society in which collective needs set few constraints on fertility but individ-
ual calculation governs it very closely.19 Two variants of a more cultural-
ist explanation involve contrast between customary and rational behaviour,
or else a transformation from traditional to modern culture.
When Livi-Bacci, one of Italys most eminent demographers, published
his study of Italian fertility as part of the Princeton project, he concluded that
Italy conformed rather closely to the classic pattern in Europe where birth
rates fell when modernization occurred. As in other countries, he argued, the
movement to lower fertility at the turn of the twentieth century was led by
the wealthy, the more educated, and the urban dwellers, whereas the poor,
the illiterate, and the rural populace lagged behind. In the south of Italy,
Attachment to traditions; a more extended and tightly knit family system;
the stronger weight of social control; the lack of womens emancipation; the
weight of the often very conservative teaching of the Church  these are
some of the manifold factors of Southern culture [which] affect, in a degree
17 C. V. Scott, Gender and Development: Rethinking Modernization Theory (London: Lynne Reiner,
1995).
18 G. Santow and M. Bracher, Traditional Families and Fertility Decline: Lessons from Australias
Southern Europeans in Leete, ed., Dynamics of Values in Fertility Change.
19 C. Tilly, ed., Historical Studies of Changing Fertility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978),
p. 44.
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not appreciably different, all sectors of the population without regard to
income, profession or residence.20
There is now something of a consensus among demographic historians
that the original hypotheses regarding the first demographic transition are
untenable. The most comprehensive refutation of this theoretical model was
supplied by work originally designed around its assumptions. The massive
European Fertility Project, conducted for over 20 years by the Office of Pop-
ulation Research at Princeton University, mapped out a complex mosaic of
fertility levels and trends in different provinces of Europe. Relying on aggre-
gate statistics, the studies found that, while urbanization and industrializa-
tion played some role in accounting for local differences in fertility, they
contributed little to explaining the timing of declines in specific localities.
Fertility in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century fell at much the
same time in rural Bulgaria and industrialized Britain; in wealthy and poor,
industrialized and agrarian, Catholic and Protestant regions. Sophisticated
statistical modelling proved that hypotheses constructed around causal links
between indices of modernization and falls in fertility did not apply.21 While
the overall results in various regions and nation-states may be similar,
detailed studies increasingly showed that they were arrived at in quite dis-
similar ways, embedded in different (though changing) cultures of contra-
ception and infant care, which in turn tended to follow language and dialect
boundaries established centuries earlier.22
Findings such as these helped consolidate a cultural turn in studies of
modern societies  and inspired my own curiosity regarding ethnicity and
gender regimes. Demographers, too, chastened by an inability to confirm
causal connections between more or less modern economies and births, have
begun examining the efficacy of a number of cultural factors in demographic
change.23 For most, this reorientation was filtered through a particular notion
of culture amenable to statistical treatment, and in particular heavy reliance
on large-scale surveys of individual attitudes. The origins of this operation-
alization of culture might well be explained by the recent dominance of a
statistical political culture approach in American universities. Whatever
the case, such an approach is deeply problematic. As Steinmentz states:
First, it was committed to an essentially behavioural form of analysis in
which the individual was the privileged unit of analysis, even if individual
20 M. Livi-Bacci, A History of Italian Fertility During the Last Two Centuries (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1977), p. 244.
21 G. Alter, Theories of Fertility Decline: A Nonspecialistss Guide to the Current Debate in J. R. Gil-
lis, L. A. Tilly, and D. Levine, eds, The European Experience of Declining Fertility, 1850–1970
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 2021.
22 Gillis et al., eds., The European Experience, p. 5; Alter, Theories of Fertility Decline, p. 21.
23 See, for example, S. C. Watkins, Demographic Nationalism in Western Europe, 18701960 in Gil-
lis et al., eds., The European Experience, pp. 270289.
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responses were subsequently aggregated for statistical processing. The indi-
vidualist bias was at odds with the point made even by Parsons that culture is
not (or not primarily) a property of individuals.... Another set of drawbacks
derived from the interweaving of modernisation theory with the political cul-
ture approach.... The most serious shortcoming ... was its failure to unpack the
dialectical relations between states and culture.24
Statistical work does not inevitably involve the assumption that the same
range of individual characteristics is unevenly distributed through different
sub-populations; society can be conceptualized as an aggregation of rela-
tively autonomous social groupings that do not necessarily share logics of
social understanding and association. Indeed, in spite of differences in ap-
proach, demographers, economists, anthropologists, and historians all agree
on the need to dis-aggregate demographic data so that different cultural and
occupational groups, family types, and localities can be studied in more
detail; on the value of combining qualitative and quantitative work; and on
the benefits of interdisciplinary studies. A good study on a single village,
one demographer famously noted, could be worth a great deal; defective
work on a nation could be dangerously misleading.25
All the same (and despite sophisticated contributions that defy this trend),
the overwhelming impression one obtains from reading large numbers of
contemporary demographic studies is that the social is constituted by sub-
populations exhibiting different combinations and strengths of the same
individual attributes. As the Princeton studies had done earlier, however,
analyses of the second demographic transition in Mediterranean countries
have contributed to challenging the theories initially used to explain it. A
typical article by Bettio and Villa starts with a paradox: existing demo-
graphic theory predicts that womens participation in the work force is
inversely related to fertility; yet nations such as Britain, the United States,
Denmark, and Sweden, where most women have jobs, have higher fertility
rates than Italy, Spain, and Greece, where their participation in the work
force is lower. The authors use a range of statistical indicators to reject the
hypothesis that Mediterranean countries faced a delay in entering demo-
graphic transition, and instead posit what is in effect an alternative model of
modernity, in which individuals achieve emancipation within, rather than
outside, a family.26
An influential form of this argument, advanced by Chesnais and Verstra-
ete, revolves around the discrepancy between Italian womens newly found
taste for emancipation and individualism and a welfare state  as well as
24 Steinmetz, Introduction, pp. 1920.
25 J. C. Caldwell, Toward a Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory, Population and Devel-
opment Review, vol. 2, nos. 34 (1976), p. 358.
26 F. Bettio and P. Villa, A Mediterranean Perspective on the Breakdown of the Relationship Between
Participation and Fertility, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 22, no. 2 (1998), p. 155.
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mens expectations  built around womens altruism and abundant supply
of unpaid work. It is widely acknowledged that womens rates of education
have risen dramatically over the last two decades, and girls now often stay in
school longer than boys. The authors believe that this development helped
erode previously accepted gender relations. The young women, they note,
have learned to see themselves as autonomous individuals, and want to reap
the financial and status benefits their investment in education warrants. Hav-
ing children threatens to undermine this strategy of personal fulfilment.27
Recent explanations of the demographic behaviour of Italians in Australia
take up a similar range of theoretical points. Bracher and Santow use their
extensive overview of published literature on Australias southern Europeans
to dispute the assumption that greater modernity leads to fewer children.
While they note that family size cannot be taken as proxy for a uniform family
structure, a comprehensive review of existing research has convinced them
that there indeed is a distinctive southern-European family: [T]hose aspects
of Southern-European behaviour that are revealed by statistical analysis to
differ from the host population are probably best viewed not in isolation from
one another, but as manifestations of a distinctive and comprehensive view of
the family. The composite picture they assemble from sources of varying
quality epitomizes both the strong and the weak points of existing work on
Italians and demography: it leads them to accept an unproblematic notion of
a coherent ethnic culture steeped in tradition, but to contest the interpretation
of its dynamics.
The authors note that family size, used by many demographers as a proxy
for the level of modernity of particular social groups, can be the result of a
strategy designed to maintain traditional values in a new environment.
Shifts in preference from large to small families ... are taken to result from a
diminution of the value placed on the family and its functions, and to provide
evidence of the ripeness of the population to fertility decline. In constrast,
Bracher and Santow argue in a Malthusian fashion, In some circumstances,
the most negotiable aspect of a family may be its size; and that, however par-
adoxical this may appear, reducing the size of ones family may be the most
effective way to ensure its survival. In particular:
To promote not just the survival but the advancement of [their ideal of a fam-
ily], all members may be called upon to make sacrifices: all members will
work hard; parents may forego additional children; children may forego the
frivolous enjoyments of their non-southern-European school-mates. Many
aspects of the actual family seem to be resistant to change; the relation
between the sexes; the structure of authority within the family; its emphasis on
marriage as the only acceptable form of adult life; its striving for economic
27 J.-C. Chesnais and C. Verstraete, Le paradoxe féministe, Le Débat (September/October 1996), pp.
6069; Chesnais, Fertility, Family, and Social Policy.
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security; its desire to conduct itself in private. But one aspect  the number of
children  has proved amenable to change.28
In all, trends routinely associated with modernity and womens emancipa-
tion might also be the product of quite different and very traditional domes-
tic relations; those who put the greatest emphasis on the family might have
fewer children than those whose allegiances are more modern. Bracher and
Santow conclude, [I]f there is paradox in the fact that southern-European
family size has declined in Australia in advance of change in traditional
southern-European family values, then the paradox may be more evident to
demographers than anyone else, and may be more evident than real.
The influential work of one of Australias foremost demographers, Peter
McDonald, combines notions of greater or lesser modernity of cultural forms
with feminist analyses of welfare states. In the past three or four decades,
McDonald argues, different institutions in society have been moving away
from the assumption of the male breadwinner model of the family in the
direction of a gender equity model. They have done so, however, at differing
speeds. Countries where the movement from patriarchy to equity is rela-
tively even across all social institutions have higher fertility rates; in coun-
tries where some institutions move fast and others lag behind, fewer babies
are born.
In Italy and Japan, for example, where womens opportunities in educa-
tion and employment are close to those of men, but family relations remain
patriarchal and few services cater to those who want to combine jobs and
motherhood, many women will avoid marriage or childbearing altogether or
will have only one child. In Scandinavian countries, in contrast, where the
gap in gender equity between the public and private spheres is less, work-
places are more family-friendly, and expenditure on family services more
adequate, birthrates are likely to be higher. Importantly, average women
are most affected. Those who are rich can afford to buy whatever domestic
help they need. Those who are already excluded from opportunities avail-
able in the labour market have nothing to lose, and a lot to gain, by having
children and being able to participate in family life.
The gaps and dissonances between nations are replicated within countries
with respect to more or less patriarchal familial cultures of different ethnic
groups. The institutional or organizational form of the family, McDonald
argues, constitutes an important part of a societys idealised morality; as
such, it is very resistant to change. Such idealized morality travels across
space. Drawing on a number of commentaries on immigrant communities in
Australia, McDonald notes that Australians of Greek and Italian origin con-
tinue to adhere to conservative attitudes to the family and to the superiority
of the adult male in family context; their families are much more patriarchal
28 Santow and Bracher, Traditional Families and Fertility Decline.
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than those of Anglo-Australians. Indeed, the fertility rates of Italians and
Greeks in Australia, which have followed the course of fertility in the home
countries, provide a particular example of the importance of family organi-
zation and idealized morality in the determination of fertility rates.29
Counting Italians in Australia
To establish the demographic characteristics of families which are the focus
of these explanations, it is first necessary to define who exactly is an Italian
in Australia and how her fertility is measured. When one of Australias fore-
most demographers attempted to clarify these issues using the 1986 census,
he came up with three different estimates. In the most commonly used defi-
nition, 261,878 people, or 1.7 per cent of the Australian population, were
born in Italy. According to this way of measuring, Slovene or German-
speakers born inside Italian borders are Italian, but French-born Italian-
speakers are French. A Sicilian-born woman who arrived in Australia at the
age of six months is Italian, but her sister, born a year later, is Australian, as
are both womens children, even though both families speak Sicilian at home
and regard themselves as natives of Ragusa. A much larger figure, 604,500
people, or 3.7 per cent of the population, represents the ethnic strength of
Italians in Australia. To obtain this figure, Price counted as Italian only those
people whose language, religion, and parents birthplace could also be con-
sidered Italian. He then allocated the Australian-born children of immigrants
to one or more appropriate ethnic groups. Accordingly, children with two
Italian parents were reckoned Italian; those with mixed parentage were allo-
cated half to each ethnic background. Finally, 507,200 people, or 3.5 per
cent of the population, identified themselves as fully Italian in terms of their
ancestry. This question, asked for the first time in the 1986 census, was
explained in the accompanying booklet in the following terms: Ancestry
means the ethnic or national group from which you are descended. It is quite
acceptable to base your answer on your grandparents ancestry. Persons of
mixed ancestry who do not identify with a single group should answer their
multiple ancestry. Persons who consider their ancestry to be Australian may
answer Australia.30 While people were asked to identify their ancestry,
only identification with relatively large groups was acceptable: they could be
Italian but not Siciliani, let alone Ragusoni.
An alternative definition of who is Italian might revolve around the use of
the Italian language at home. Rando and Leoni note that, in Australia, Italian
is the most widely spoken community language after English, with close to
half a million speakers. For census and other statistical purposes, it is
assumed that all speakers of Italian use the same language: the one taught
in Italian language classes. In fact, most Italians speak varieties other than
29 McDonald, Gender Equity.
30 C. A. Price, Ethnic Groups in Australia (Canberra: Office of Multicultural Affairs, Department of
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1989).
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the standard one and perhaps as many as 45 per cent use a dialect habitually
or exclusively. At the same time, in communicating with each other, Italian
Australians often use what can be termed Australian Italian, a variety of
Popular Italian, defined as a social variety of Italian used by the lesser edu-
cated, mainly dialectophones who, guided by the model of Standard Italian,
try to achieve a common linguistic denominator which might enable com-
munication beyond the limits imposed upon them by their dialects. In addi-
tion, many second-generation Italians strongly identify themselves as Italian,
even though they often use mainly English, even at home.31
Calculations of differential fertility rates depend not only on being able to
distinguish ethnic from Australian mothers, but on the use of more or
less complex statistical techniques. The simplest of these is to compare the
numbers of babies born to Italian and Australian women. Using figures from
the 1966 census, for example, Ware found that 26 per cent of Australian-
born women but 37 per cent of Italian-born women aged 45 to 54 had four or
more children; for those aged 55 and over, the corresponding figures were 25
and 44 per cent.32 In 1971 the crude birth rate for Italian-born women was 50
per cent higher than for the Australian-born: 32.30 compared to 20.12. Ital-
ian women, as everyone could see and statistics repeatedly confirmed, bred
like rabbits.33
The problem is that Italians were demographically different from Aus-
tralians. Not least because of selective immigration policies, most were
young adults, and the majority were male. For every five Italian women,
there were six men. Rather than a pyramid, the age distribution of Italian
immigrants resembled a spindle: almost a third of women born in Australia
but only about one in ten women born in southern Europe were under 15
years of age.34 Racism confronting Italians  and their own or relatives
inability to speak English  strengthened whatever preference they might
have had for marrying each other. As a result of these factors, most women
of Italian origin in Australia were at once of child-bearing age and married.
In the 15-to-49 age group, 65 per cent of Australian-born women but 85 per
cent of Italian-born women were married.35 When compared to the general
population, Italian women indeed had a disproportionately high number of
babies. In comparison to the fertility rate of married Australian women of
31 G. Rando and F. Leoni, The Italian Language in Australia: Sociolinguistic Aspects in C. Alcorso et
al., eds, Australia’s Italians: Culture and Community in a Changing Society (Sydney: Allen and
Unwin, 1992).
32 H. Ware, Immigrant Fertility: Behaviour and Attitudes, International Migration Review, vol. 9, no.
3 (1975), p. 363.
33 In a popular 1950s novel They’re a Weird Mob, an improbable dago family had an imaginary house
built with a chute for babies leading to the basement.
34 E. Yusuf and G. Eckstein, Fertility of Migrant Women in Australia, Journal of Biosocial Science,
vol. 12, no. 2 (1980), pp. 182183.
35 E. Yusuf and I. Rockett, Immigrant Fertility: Patterns and Differentials in Australia, 197176, Pop-
ulation Studies, vol. 35, no. 3 (1981), pp. 415416.
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childbearing age, however, this differential was reduced. When they were
compared to women of similar income and education, the difference disap-
peared altogether.
Measurements of completed fertility produced unanticipated results as
well. In his analysis of the 1971 Australian census, Day concluded that mar-
ried Italian women born between 1907 and 1911 had substantially more chil-
dren over their lifetimes than the Australian-born, but that among the 1927
1931 cohort, the opposite was the case: Italian-born women had between
two-thirds and three-quarters of the number of children of their Australian-
born counterparts. The contrast was even greater if the same cohort of Italian
women was compared to Australian-born Catholics. One in five Australian-
born Catholic women who married before age 26 had six or more children,
but fewer than one in twelve Italians did so.36 Similarly, Young notes that
Italian women born between 1927 and 1936 had somewhat lower completed
fertility than the Australian-born.37
Total fertility rate (TFR) is calculated by adding all age-specific fertility
rates for a given year. This widely used measure can account for women who
have not yet completed childbearing, but can hide a range of contrary trends
affecting different cohorts. These trends can be disaggregated using complex
statistical techniques, but are largely inaccessible to those without specialist
technical skills. In Australia, average Italian TFR was 3.38 in 1971 and
declined to 2.44 in 1976; Italian marital TFR fell from 5.67 to 4.2, and Italian
non-marital TFR from 0.76 to 0.41. A more elaborate procedure, called the
own child method, is used when data on the number of children ever born
are not available. When one uses this technique, which estimates birthrates
from the number of young children who can be matched with their mothers in
the same dwelling on census day, the TFR of the first generation of Italians
was recently estimated to be 1.6 and that of the second generation 1.7.38
The problem remains that fertility rates for distinct social groups should
compare like with like. Using multiple regression analysis to match groups
of women on a range of indicators such as income, education, occupation, or
urban and rural residence to explain the higher than average fertility rates of
southern European women recorded in the 1966 census, Ware concluded that
the most significant explanation of the gap between the southern-European-
born immigrants and the native-born population is ... through differences in
socio-economic status. The behaviour of the scantily-educated, unskilled,
poor, southern European immigrants is not so very different from that of
36 L. H. Day, Minority-group Status and Fertility: A More Detailed Test of the Hypothesis, Sociologi-
cal Quarterly, vol. 25 (Autumn 1984), pp. 456472.
37 C. M. Young, Changes in the Demographic Behaviour of Migrants in Australia and the Transition
Between Generations, Population Studies, vol. 45, no. 1 (1991), pp. 6789.
38 M. J. Abbasi-Shavazi and P. McDonald, Fertility and Multiculturalism: Immigrant Fertility in Aus-
tralia, 19771991, The International Migration Review, vol. 34, no. 1 (2000), p. 230.
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native-born wives who are similarly underprivileged. The contrast lies in the
fact that there are very few native-born wives who are similarly underprivi-
leged, and for that reason immigrant behaviour appears to be distinctive.39
In his statistical analysis of the 1991 census, when southern Europeans
appeared to have lower fertility but remained underprivileged, Abbasi-
Shavazi similarly concluded that birthplace, except for Lebanon, was not
significantly related to fertility when other variables were taken into account.
This suggests that, all else being equal, most birthplace groups would have
similar fertility to Australian women. However, when he combined data for
Italians and Greeks to create a variable indicating southern European birth-
place, a multiple regression model suggested a different result: on average,
about 37.6 per cent of such women would have a child under three, 12.1 per
cent lower than Australia-born women.40
There is wide agreement that Southern Europeans in general and people of
Italian origin in particular have distinct demographic patterns, which today
include a lower fertility rate. Analyses of the 1986 survey of the Australian
Family Project, for example, repeatedly found that, in many respects, the
behaviour of Australias Southern Europeans and their daughters remained
clearly distinct from that of other Australians. In particular, cohabitation is
rare, and their marriage rates are higher and marriages more stable than those
of other immigrants or the native-born.41 However, there is less agreement on
when the trend to lower fertility commenced, whether it is limited to women
who spent a substantial part of their lives in Italy, and whether ethnic or
cultural differences in fertility rates would disappear with more sophisti-
cated statistical measurement. Counting Italians also depends on whether
people identify themselves as Italian, and this in turn is related to a host of
ongoing cultural practices productive of distinctive cultural identity. Leaving
aside the problem of whether women of Italian origin do indeed have higher
or lower fertility rates than other Australians, explanations of why they are
different tend to revolve around the themes of modernity, tradition, and cul-
tural maintenance. In all, the same cultural processes help constitute what is
to be explained and are drawn upon in explanations of its dynamics.
Italian Families, Tradition, and Modernity
Europe ends at Naples and ends badly. Calabria, Sicily and all the rest belong
to Africa. [Creuzé de Lesser, 1806]42
39 Ware, Immigrant Fertility: Behaviour and Attitudes, p. 376.
40 M. J. Abbasi-Shavazi, Fertility Patterns of Selected Australian Immigrant Groups, 19771991
(PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1998), pp. 213, 216.
41 Santow and Bracher, Traditional Families and Fertility Decline, p. 71.
42 Quoted in G. Gribaudi, Images of the South: The Mezzogiorno as Seen by Outsiders and Insiders in
R. Lumley and J. Morris, eds., The New History of the Italian South: The Mezzgiorno Revisited
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), p. 87.
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Sardinia, Sicily and the Mezzogiorno are three peoples who are still primitive,
not completely evolved, less civilised and refined than the populations of the
North and Centre of Italy. [Alfredo Niceforo, L’Italia barbara contemporanea,
1898]43
This remarkable and rapid decrease in fertility [in Italy] ... is the result of deep
transformation in the values and behaviours that have touched the family
nucleus after centuries of tradition ... [the] process of transformation from a
single model of the household towards a plurality of family types is still in
motion.44
Virtually all our family occasions, from the daily dinner to the annual holidays,
and including the great life-cycle events like christenings, weddings and funer-
als, are the product of the second half of the nineteenth century.45
In popular imagination, we all share an imaginary patriarchal past of
extended families, strong fathers, full-time housewives, plentiful and respect-
ful children, picturesque cottages, and delicious family meals. In the west this
image belongs to the time of our great-grandparents and grandparents; in less
developed regions, it is still alive. Whatever its historical accuracy, this pic-
ture plays a significant role in assessing the present and imagining the future.
For modernization theorists and many demographers, conservative patriar-
chal families of the past and of less modern cultures have begun to give way
to gender egalitarian ones. Drawing on a range of writings within (broadly
defined) social history, I depict a different version of the past. Rather than
greater or lesser modernity, the picture contains a number of complex and
interdependent family forms. Rather than indicating an autonomous process
of modernization, it draws attention to mutual dependencies of diverse eco-
nomic regions, the role of state agencies, and political mobilizations. Finally,
the very notions of tradition and modernity are depicted as important stakes
in a highly contested process of constructing collective identities.
In early studies of historical demography, it was common to group Euro-
pean families into two categories: those in northwestern Europe, character-
ized by late marriage for both men and women, neo-local nuclear households,
and high levels of permanent celibacy; and those in southern Europe and
Asia, characterized by young ages at marriage, particularly for women, com-
plex households, and negligible celibacy rates. Recent historical work paints
43 Quoted in J. Dickie, Stereotypes of the Italian South in Lumley and Morris, eds., The New History
of the Italian South, p. 115.
44 S. S. DAndrea, Italian Quality of Life, Social Indicators Research, vol. 44, no. 1 (1998), pp. 23,
25.
45 J. Gillis, Making Time for Family: The Invention of Family Time(s) and the Reinvention of Family
History, Journal of Family History, vol. 21, no. 1 (1996), p. 8, and A World of Their Own Making:
Myth, Ritual and Quest for Family Values (New York: Basic Books, 1996).
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a more complex picture, both in the north and in the south. Levine and Sec-
combe, for example, are among those who argue, in opposition to the Cam-
bridge school of historical demography, that the same nominal composition
of households in northwestern Europe between the sixteenth and the nine-
teenth centuries does not imply one unchanging family form. Thus peasant,
proto-industrial, proletarian, and male breadwinner households might con-
tain identical numbers of adults and children, but share little else.46 Similarly,
Maynes, Taylor, and Kriedte demonstrate that the same number of children
can be produced by a regime of conservation (where fewer babies are born
to mothers at greater intervals but a large proportion survive) or a regime of
wastefulness (with many births and high mortality).47 Szreter argues not
only that there were many different demographic transitions in England in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but that the same fertility rate
can result from quite different regimes of contraception (such as sexual
sophistication in France and fumbling abstinence in England). Importantly,
Szreter makes an explicit and comprehensive case against the almost univer-
sal assumption that socio-economic status is smoothly linked to fertility.
While most demographers and lay commentators assume that, the lower a
couples status, the more children they are likely to have (because of a num-
ber of factors that can be roughly summarized as lesser modernity), Szreter
argues that some groups of unskilled workers in England pioneered small
families, while a few of the most privileged continued to have large numbers
of children. Prior assumptions about greater or lesser civility, he argues,
produced erroneous statistical analyses.48
A parallel argument can be made with regard to the region now called
Italy. Barbagli, for example, concludes that in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries there were three dominant patterns of family formation, which in
addition changed over time, above all in response to new economic condi-
tions.49 The first pattern combined patrilocal residence after marriage with
late marriage and predominated mainly in the rural regions of northern and
46 See, for example, D. Levine, Reproducing Families: The Political Economy of English Population
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); W. Seccombe, A Millennium of Family
Change: Feudalism to Capitalism in Northwestern Europe (London: Verso, 1992).
47 M. J. Maynes and T. Taylor, Germany in J. M. Hawes and N. R. Hiner, Children in Historical and
Comparative Perspective: An International Handbook (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); P.
Kriedte, H. Medick, and J. Schlumbohm, Proto-industrialisation Revisited: Demography, Social
Structure, and Modern Domestic Industry, Continuity and Change, vol. 8, no. 2 (1993), pp. 223,
225.
48 S. Szreter, Fertility, Class and Gender in Britain, 1860–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), and Falling Fertilities and Changing Sexualities in Europe Since c1850: A Comparative
Survey of National Demographic Patterns (Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian
National University, 1996).
49 M. Barbagli, Marriage and the Family in the Early Nineteenth Century in J. A. Davis and P. Gins-
borg, eds., Society and Politics in the Age of the Risorgimento (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), pp. 92127.
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central Italy. Here, most of the population lived in multiple households.
Those with the most land tended to have the largest and most complex
households; among the poorer peasants and share croppers in particular,
many of the younger sons and daughters never married. The second model
consisted of simple conjugal households and early marriage (for women at
least, but often also for men), and this was typical in the south; in a number
of localities, the proportion of complex households was among the lowest in
Europe. Here, young couples from more prosperous families set up their
own households with provisions from both sets of parents; those from poorer
circumstances began their married life in debt. This pattern is significant
because it cuts across both earlier demographic theory (which held that early
marriage in rural societies goes with complex, multi-generational house-
holds), and historical common sense which associates tradition and
early marriage for women with patriarchal extended families.
The third model consisted of single-family households and late marriage
for both men and women, and this was common throughout the cities of
northern and central Italy, as well as in Sardinia. In urban Italy, both neo-
local residence after marriage and the simple conjugal household had been
widespread since the fourteenth century, except among the elites, who lived
in patrilocal households and spent the greater part of their lives in either
extended or multiple households. By the end of the eighteenth century, they
too began to adopt neo-local residence and simple conjugal households after
marriage. In Sardinia, where the pattern of landholding resembled that of
Sicily but the age at marriage for both women and men was among the high-
est in Italy, it is likely that distinct customs of inheritance and marital prop-
erty played a part. In theory, at least, sons and daughters inherited equally,
and marriage partners held property in common; here, both women and men
worked to accumulate sufficient funds before they married.
Barbagli relates the difference in marriage patterns between peasants in
northern and central Italy and the south to the predominant patterns of land
tenure. In the north and centre, agriculture was organized around peasant
farmsteads scattered thinly around the countryside and surrounded by the
fields they worked; this pattern encouraged the formation of complex house-
holds. In the south, in contrast, the preponderance of large estates and exten-
sive farming, as well as the dispersal and fragmentation of peasant land,
were common. Here, the farm labourers and peasants tended to live not on
the land they worked but in larger and often distant settlements. This pattern
of settlement in turn encouraged the formation of single conjugal house-
holds.50 Ironically, an influential anthropological study of one such isolated
southern village, characterized by inward-looking nuclear households and a
lack of civic consciousness ascribed in part to the absence of extended fam-
50 Ibid.
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ily forms, has entered the public imagination as proof of the anti-modern
tendencies of traditional extended families.51
The significance of this emphasis on historical diversity is accentuated if
family forms within one region are further disaggregated. In sophisticated
work on the first demographic transition in Sicily, Jane and Peter Schneider
provide a model of such work. The authors looked at the impact of major
transformations in political economy on different family forms. They con-
cluded that not only the timing, but the logics and dynamics, of demographic
transition were considerably different among landless peasants, those with
viable farms, artisans, and the gentry  not least because different social
groups were characterized by considerably different forms of gender rela-
tions.52 Their focus on the landless peasants, whose lives are most often
described in terms of tradition, is not accidental  it is here that the theo-
retical premises of demographic accounts are most exposed to alternative
forms of interpretation.
In Italy, as in other western societies, until the late nineteenth century pop-
ulation and resources expanded together: the rich almost invariably had
larger families than their poorer neighbours. The wealthy tended to marry
younger, were less affected by sterility and still-births caused by hunger and
disease, and had more resources to bring children into adulthood. In the late
nineteenth century, this relationship was reversed. In Sicily, too, while the
gentry and artisans began having fewer children, the landless peasants, in
spite of falling mortality, began to have more. Men of the gentry, who pio-
neered the demographic transition in Sicily, were motivated among other
things by declining incomes from land. Yet their behaviour displayed little of
the self-restraint usually associated with modernity. Men who valued
immoderate indulgence and predatory sexuality did not resort to Malthusian
abstinence, but sexually exploited servant and peasant women. Their wives
were legendary for overlooking such sexual excesses, suffering long years of
abstinence, with occasional abortions in Palermo. The economic and other
drawbacks of large families, in other words, were taken into account by men
who did not abandon traditional lack of self-restraint and resulted in fewer
children by women who could hardly be described as liberated.
Fertility transition among the Sicilian artisan class occurred between the
First and Second World Wars  a period during which the new association
51 Gribaudi, Images of the South, pp. 106108. The anthropological study is Edward Banfields 1958
work on amoral familism, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society.
52 J. Schneider and P. Schneider, Going Forward in Reverse Gear: Culture, Economy and Political
Economy in the Demographic Transitions of a Rural Sicilian Town in Gillis et al., eds., The Euro-
pean Experience. This conclusion contrasts with the more influential view of Livi-Bacci and Bresci,
who argue that, in the south, there was low differential fertility among social categories and between
city and the country; cultural rather than socioeconomic factors apparently exercised a pronounced
transversal control in demographic behaviour. M. Livi Bacci and M. Breschi, Italian Fertility: An
Historical Account, Journal of Family History, vol. 15, no. 4 (1990), p. 404.
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between large families and poverty became increasingly visible and ac-
knowledged. Until the 1920s, artisans had between five and thirteen living
children; after 1930, the great majority had two or at most three. According to
the Schneiders, reasons for limiting fertility included considerations such as
cessation of economically beneficial out-migration and more expensive
apprenticeships. In contrast to other social groups, fertility limitation was
played out within companionate marriages, built around the crucial and visi-
ble contribution by wives to craft shop and workshop. Even the all-male lei-
sure pursuits of the artisans, the authors note, were more compatible with
partnership with women than those of the gentry or peasants. According to
oral histories, artisan men saw coitus interruptus as a fine and complex
learned skill: Most artisan men ... interviewed characterised their birth-con-
trol efforts as requiring a high degree of communication and cooperation
between the spouses  a characterisation seconded by the women.
Among the landless peasants, the bracciante, the dynamic of family limi-
tation was different again. The Schneiders note that reminiscences as well as
scholarly explanations tend to be built around concepts such as tradition,
instincts, and religious fatalism. The system of patriarchal honour and shame,
with womens tolerance of a degree of promiscuity in sons and husbands,
coupled with obscene and sacrilegious joking in all-male groups, strict polic-
ing of womens chastity, and their ostensible subordination to male authority,
is also an important part of the accepted explanation. In this system, there
were much stronger emotional bonds between mothers and children and their
own parents than with husbands. The Schneiders do not reject all aspects of
this explanation, but argue that the picture was more complex. The alterna-
tive they paint is directly relevant to my argument regarding the relatively
recent origin of much of the tradition that forms the currency of explana-
tions of Italian culture, whether in Italy itself or in emigrant destinations
such as Australia.
In their work, the authors depict the desperate poverty of bracciante and
the many humiliations to which it led: overcrowded hovels where accepted
rules of chastity and respect could not be observed, chronic hunger and sick-
ness, womens inability to care for babies themselves because they had to
work away from home (at times as wet nurses for the rich), their lack of an
education in Italian and hence the necessity to find others to mediate when
they dealt with government officials, their dependence on gentry handouts
and at times begging to survive. Most parents were too poor to provide hous-
ing for newlyweds; the majority of people married with debts and initially
lived in rented housing. The greatest humiliations, however, grew out of the
dispersal of the family as a working group.
Bracciante men relied on badly paid seasonal wage labour. Their life con-
sisted of days of intense physical exertion and days of sitting around with
other men in local taverns. Most adult women had to work away from home,
often because mens employment was conditional on supplying their wives
and daughters as servants. Children, too, had to work: boys at seven or eight
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alongside a father or grandfather and later as shepherds for landowners; girls
by the age of nine cooking, looking after infants, and cleaning for their own
families and later working as servants. Since such work was necessary to
accumulate funds for a wedding, it was difficult to quit to escape sexual
abuse by employers or their sons. In any case, even if she did avoid assault,
the common perception was that a woman could not maintain honour and
purity while she worked as a servant. In this context, the machismo of brac-
ciante men was tempered by the fact that their wives served not them, but
the upper class, who might have taken liberties that the husbands and fathers
were impotent to prevent. The men felt shame tinged with rage that they
could not effectively retain their wives and daughters at home, or even pro-
vide separate sleeping places for their male and female children. In effect,
servile relations drained energy from one group of families to add it to
another, and the poor knew it and resented it. The result was an interde-
pendent demography between the two classes: bracciante milk nurtured gen-
try infants and bracciante mothers cared for them and, as gentry couples
reduced their fertility, the braccianti increased theirs.
This double characteristic of dispersal and service distinguished landless
peasants from the minority of landed peasants, the burgisi. The burgisi,
whose families seem to provide a model for the collective remembering of a
patriarchal past in Italian history, also had many children, but unlike the
bracciante remembered their early lives with affection. Many reminisced
fondly and nostalgically about large families and typically spoke of their kin
as interdependent and pulling together. Having land and livestock, a burgisi
father mobilized his childrens labour to maintain and enhance the family
patrimony, putting his sons to work for him or claiming their earnings if they
worked for others. A common fund served to provide trousseaux for girls
and sons marriage settlements; in hard times, children delayed marriage
until their thirties.
The bracciante, in contrast, remembered hunger, overworked mothers,
colds, illness  and the support of their mothers and mothers-in-law when
they themselves began to make a serious effort to limit their families in the
1950s and 1960s. This last demographic transition took place in the context
of increased opportunities, rather than, as in the past, cycles of crisis. Family
limitation enabled men to claim the respectability and authority over their
households that they had previously lacked. For their part, bracciante
women were not forced back to the home; recollections of both men and
women give the impression that labourers wives organized a strike under
the slogan ognuno per i nostri mariti (every woman for her own husband).
The woman, formerly forced to disperse her energies, could now retire to
the home to devote her labour and attention to her own husband and chil-
dren, rather than clean, provide food, and care for the families and property
of others. The Schneiders note, Sicilian bracciante gave a straightforward
answer to the question of why they now practice contraception: it is the only
way to have a decent life. Before their struggle and the land reform, no bet-
ter life seemed possible. Like artisans, both bracciante men and women
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began to talk about coitus interruptus as a valuable and finely honed skill
(and one much easier to practise now that the parents had a separate bed-
room). They also began to associate it with two Malthusian virtues: sacrifice
(fare sacrifici) and striving for social betterment and respectability, and its
converse, contempt for the sexuality of those whose multiple offspring
proved them less self-controlled. Unlike the artisans, however, the brac-
ciante did not plan in advance how many children they wanted. Rather, they
had additional children as circumstances permitted, sometimes with a gap of
ten years or more.
The Schneiders conclude that no single model of traditional culture will
explain the fact that southern Italy underwent its demographic transition
later than the north, or that landless peasants were the last to be affected.
While western values have indeed spread to twentieth-century Sicily, they
are a correlate to and consequence of fertility decline, not its cause. Rather
than breaking with tradition, Sicilian peasants organized the transition to
smaller families to realize previously unattainable values of dignity and
respectability as defined by their culture. They did so in the context of state-
sponsored land reform, initiated in response to widespread rural radicalism.
Work such as this gains even grater significance if it is set against writings
on notions of the Italian past. A recent overview history of Italy, for example,
draws on work which suggests that the Risorgimento, and the myth of an Ital-
ian national character and the family life that nurtured it, was built on an
idealization of life in the countryside  the myth of the Italian peasant devel-
oped by Vincenzo Cuoco and his praise of the system of patriarchal cultiva-
tion.53 The code of honour itself, so frequently used in accounts of Medi-
terranean families and societies by anthropologists, has been described as an
invented tradition, a strategy through which vulnerable sectors of southern
Italian society defended themselves against peripheralization.54 Indeed, while
outsiders tend to attribute Italian traditions to all Italians, for the last century
and a half those writing on Italy itself were more likely to contrast the tradi-
tionalism of the south with the dynamism and modernity of the north.
One recent collection of essays illustrates these issues. While they start
from a number of disciplines and approaches, the authors have in common
an emphasis on the specificity and diversity of southern history and society
and the internal rationality of social processes that have often been analysed
in terms of adherence to timeless tradition, or else through some inherent
deficit of the southern character.55 A significant part of the project is an
attempt to chart the making of merridionalismo: constructions of the south
53 C. Dugan, A Concise History of Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); G. Bollati,
L’Italiano: Il Carattere Nazionale Come Storia e Come Invenzione (Torino: G. Einaudi, 1983), p.
101.
54 J. Schneider and P. Schneider, Culture and Political Economy in Western Sicily (New York: Academic
Press, 1976).
55 J. Morris, Challenging Merridionalismo: Constructing a New History for Southern Italy in Lumley
and Morris, eds., The New History of the Italian South, pp. 119.
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as a southern problem which needed to be resolved if the newly created
Italian nation, modelled on the best civic traditions of the centre-north, was
to achieve true greatness.
Italian Women and Work
In our country, women work far more than men do. In manual industries
1 379 905 men are employed, compared to 1 692 740 women; in other words
for every hundred male artisans there are 123 females. [Enrico Fano, 1868,
commenting on the 1861 Italian census]56
In Italy it was different. There the women didnt work, they all stayed in their
houses and first their fathers worked and then their husbands. Here its all dif-
ferent, the women must work too. This is the main difference.57
A central part of the imagined tradition of Italian patriarchal past is the
almost universal absence of married women from the work force. When
interviewed in Australia, most Italian immigrants stressed that back home
their mothers, older sisters, and grandmothers gave up paid work after they
married. Most commentaries on Italian immigrants in Australia similarly
note that the necessity that women work for pay in a modern industrial econ-
omy was one of the most difficult transitions that people from traditional
rural communities had to make. Here, I paint a more complex picture.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, a number of historians sug-
gest, Italy resembled other European countries: among the poor, all members
of the family needed to contribute to remunerative work; only the better-off
could afford to have mother work just in the home or even to send children
regularly to school. In her work on northern and central Italy, for example,
Cammarosano shows not only that women from the labouring classes
worked throughout their lives in a mixture of remunerative and domestic
tasks, but also that early capitalist industry was a predominantly female and
child endeavour. At the same time, employment in only one occupation
throughout the year was the exception rather than the rule, for women as
well as men.
Most labouring families shared the necessity to assemble a living from a
patchwork of subsistence activities, even though regional and individual pat-
terns varied widely. Children would be sent to service; women, children, and
old people would work the small piece of land and make use of the gleaning
rights allocated to men alongside the cash payment men received for their
own work. In mountainous regions, men would migrate every year in search
of seasonal work, only to return for the harvest, while women and children
worked in domestic industry and subsistence agriculture. Some male family
56 Quoted in Barbagli, Marriage and the Family, pp. 156157.
57 D. B. Kasnitz, Work, Gender and Health Among Southern Italian Immigrants in Melbourne, Austra-
lia (London: University of London, Microfilms International, 1981), p. 13.
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members would venture further afield, working in road gangs in Germany,
building sites in America, coffee plantations in Brazil, cane fields in Austra-
lia. To make a living, families would combine income and produce from ten-
ant farming and homesteading, from kitchen gardens and domestic animals,
from a variety of domestic industries, both for use and for sale, with what
they earned as petty traders, as well as from waged work in the fields and on
the roads, in quarries and on the railroads, in workshops and factories, in
mining and construction or the navy, in military and domestic service, and
from scavenging and petty theft. When statisticians in the newly unified
Italy attempted to gain a picture of what people did for a living, they classi-
fied a substantial proportion of the working population, male as well as
female, as being in unspecified employment.
How can such evidence be reconciled with the almost universal memories
of women all staying in their houses? First, there is a widespread tendency,
among statisticians and ordinary people alike, to under-report womens
remunerative activity. Today, work is overwhelmingly understood as a for-
mal paid job. Such understanding has a history, which combines employ-
ment, taxation, and administrative practices with notions of individual and
collective respectability. In Australia as well as Italy, for example, many
womens diffuse economic activities ceased to be reckoned as work by cen-
sus enumerators in late nineteenth century, partly as a result of concerns with
new notions of national reputation. In the Italian census of 1881, the defini-
tion of female worker was restricted to women who stuck to one occupation
and did not intersperse their remunerative activities with other duties. Partly
as a result, the category housewife leaped from just under 400,000 to
nearly ten times that number a decade later.58 Such constitutive changes
are significant in both gender and comparative terms: in many regions and
social groups, they have made it difficult to map out the activities of a signif-
icant proportion of the irregularly employed male work force as well.59
Today, statistical measures of work force participation consistently indi-
cate that a smaller proportion of married women in Italy work compared to
their counterparts in countries with more adequate provision of social ser-
vices. Sunstrom, for example, shows that, among married women with chil-
dren under ten years of age, 80 per cent of those in Sweden worked
compared to 41 per cent in Italy. In Sweden 38 per cent of the working moth-
ers were employed part-time compared to 12 per cent in Italy.60 However, a
58 S. O. Cammarosano, Labouring Women in Northern and Central Italy in the Nineteenth Century in
Davis and Ginsborg, eds., Society and Politics, p. 158. For Australia, see D. Deacon, Political Arith-
metic: The Nineteenth-century Australian Census and the Construction of the Dependant Woman,
Signs, vol. 11, no. 1 (1985), pp. 2747. See also N. Folbre, The Unproductive Housewife: Her Evo-
lution in Nineteenth-century Economic Thought, Signs, vol. 16, no. 3 (1991), pp. 463484.
59 See, for example, D. R. Holmes, Cultural Disenchantments: Worker Peasantries in Northeast Italy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 207.
60 E. Sunstrom, Should Mothers Work? Age and Attitudes in Germany, Italy and Sweden, Interna-
tional Journal of Social Welfare, vol. 8, no. 3 (1999), p. 195.
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number of scholars point out that statistical measures of womens participa-
tion in the work force in Italy are deeply problematic. This is above all
because work still tends to be conceptualized as full-time, legal, life-long,
paid work, mainly done by men, for a family wage, for big employers in
industry or services. Women (and immigrants), in contrast, tend to be dispro-
portionately involved in atypical work and in informal and black sec-
tors of the economy, which in turn form a disproportionate share of the
Italian economy. Stratigaki and Vaiou, for example, note that in 1989 women
in Southern Europe comprised 80 to 90 per cent of the estimated 1.5 million
home workers.61
The second reason for the widespread memories of women who did not
work relates to a historically unique period in Italian (and indeed western)
history: a short-lived era of housewives after the Second World War when
the male breadwinner family gained hegemony. Saraceno notes that, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, women as well as children in most large
towns of the Italian centre-north had a high rate of participation in the labour
force. For both newly migrated and longstanding urban women, working for
pay was part of the traditional family economy. According to Saraceno,
in working-class families at the beginning of the century the new culture of the
intimate family and motherhood, as well as of the rights of children, was not
widespread. However, changes in legislation concerning child and female
labour, and the access to some schooling for children, started to change the tra-
ditional framework of gender and generational relations as well: putting very
young children to work became less usual and legitimate, and the womens
role as homemaker became crucial for family well-being and respectability in
addition to her capacity to earn money, if necessary.
By the mid-1930s, an age-related pattern of womens participation in the
work force became more firmly established, with the bulk of women leaving
work on marriage, but a minority remaining in paid work.62
Only between the 1940s and 1960s, however, did a growing proportion of
married women accede to  or were driven to  the role of full-time
housewife that had previously been common in the urban lower and upper
middle class. Even then, during decades when a maximum number of adult
women devoted themselves to full-time homemaking, in bourgeois families
and in many middle-class families of the 1950s the heavier domestic tasks
were performed by servants. The daughters and sometimes the wives of the
more modest classes, especially rural classes, were handed over by their
61 M. Stratigaki and D.Vaiou, Womens Work and Informal Activities in Southern Europe, Environ-
ment and Planning A, vol. 26 (1994), p. 1229.
62 C. Saraceno, Constructing Families, Shaping Womens Lives: The Making of Italian Families
Between Market Economy and State Interventions in Gillis et al., eds., The European Experience,
p. 256.
Tradition, Modernity, and Italian Babies 221
families to the more affluent to guarantee the physical work required for a
comfortable domestic life. Saraceno concludes that the figure of the adult
married woman as a full-time homemaker, only recently emerged, was short-
lived in society and the family  although it lives on tenaciously in the col-
lective imagination.63
For many working people, mothers ability to work only in the home sig-
nified far more than imitation of middle-class ideals. Goddard, writing on
Naples, argues for example:
The attributes of motherhood ... represent the integrity of the group  whether
this be the family or the community  against the negative effects of systems
which operate according to different moralities. Both capitalism and the state
are seen to be based on principles deprived of personal content, where personal
considerations are irrelevant. Here, calculation and gain overrule reciprocity
and self-sacrifice. Profit is seen as the aim of capitalist production, and this is
seen as being accomplished through exploitation, through patterns of work
which are disadvantageous to the weaker parties.... Women, on the other hand,
when located in the context of the family, stand for self-negation and generos-
ity. Women and kin stand for the positive identity of the poor of the city and
for an opposition to the amorality of work and the state.64
In addition, since waged work evidently involves exploitation, it is logically
likely to (and often does) involve sexual exploitation as well.
Italian immigration to Australia peaked in the 1950s and 1960s, a period
when most married women indeed were full-time homemakers and wives
employment, in both countries, was associated with lack of respectability.
Nevertheless, the remembered tradition of women working only in the home
in Italy contrasts with common precepts about the necessity for emigrant
mothers to get jobs. Although most working-class southern Italians would
agree that ideally the husband should be the sole breadwinner, one scholar
notes,  they recognise that this is an Australian impossibility.65 Only where
Italian men had greater opportunities to enter skilled work and establish
small businesses, such as in Latin America, were male breadwinner families
more numerous.66
In both Italy and Australia, the era of housewives has passed. Indeed, the
dynamic of its demise is believed to be a key motive force behind falling fer-
tility rates. As Saraceno put it with regard to Italy, [R]egardless of their own
choices, mothers give their daughters messages that say paid work for
63 C. Saraceno, The Italian Family: Paradoxes of Privacy in A. Prost and G. Vincent, eds, A History of
Private Life: Vol. v, Riddles of Identity in Modern Times (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1991).
64 V. A. Goddard, Gender, Family, and Work in Naples (Oxford: Berg, 1996), pp. 224225.
65 Kasnitz, Work, Gender and Health, pp. 206207, 260261.
66 D. Gabaccia, Is Everywhere Nowhere? Nomads, Nations, and the Immigrant Paradigm of United
States History, Journal of American History, vol. 86, no. 3 (1999), pp. 11301131.
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women, even if they are married, is valuable  for reasons of personal
autonomy, as family insurance in a time of insecure employment, or as
personal insurance against the hazards of marriage relationships.67 A
recent multinational survey of attitudes towards a traditional gender divi-
sion of labour showed that even the oldest group of men and women in Italy
were more progressive than their counterparts in Germany. Young Italian
women were the most radical of all age and country groups, including Swed-
ish women.68
Short-lived as it was, the era of housewives left a lasting legacy to west-
ern societies: welfare states and civil societies structured around womens
unpaid work. In post-war Italy, the very organization of existing services 
scarcity of preschool child care, short school days, lack of services for the
elderly and the handicapped, shop opening hours, hospital services  all
required careful family organization based on the mothers full-time pres-
ence. Such general trends were accentuated or alleviated by regional factors.
For example, in spite of higher fertility levels, there were no day care centres
in Sicily until the early 1980s, and many fewer services for children and
older people, than in the centre-north. During a period of change in the
1970s, a number of caring needs, particularly for children, were at least par-
tially redefined as individual social rights; with the financial stringency of
the 1990s, the increasing recourse to family-based means testing has tended
to weaken individual rights in favour of family rights and (compulsory) fam-
ily solidarity, particularly with regard to health care.69
Such complex links between states, families, and economies are not con-
fined to the modern period. Many social historians routinely point out that,
in western societies, increasing state intervention in the family since the nine-
teenth century went hand in hand with ever-more insistent characterization of
the home as a private space. In her extensive work on gender and social policy,
Saraceno not only repeatedly refers to such contradictory processes, but
argues that the scale and explicit and pervasive nature of this intervention may
be unique to Italy, at least in the period from the 1870s to the Second World
War.70 The Italian state, she suggests, helped reconstruct family forms
through a number of unusually effective interventions for a century before
what is often seen as the emergence of a modern welfare system.
67 C. Saraceno, Changes in Life-course Patterns and Behavior of Three Cohorts of Italian Women,
Signs, vol. 16, no. 3 (1991), p. 512.
68 Sunstrom, Should Mothers Work?, p. 202.
69 Saraceno, The Italian Family: Paradoxes of Privacy, pp. 463464, 499. In an influential early theo-
rization of such work, Balbo spoke of women making a satisfying patchwork quilt out of otherwise
unusable fragments of services and resources. L. Balbo, Crazy Quilts: Rethinking the Welfare State
Debate from a Womans Point of View in A. S. Sassoon, ed., Women and the State (London: Hutch-
inson, 1987), pp. 4571. Since all western countries experienced similar emphasis on male breadwin-
ner families, however, the era of housewives alone cannot account for the particular familism of
Mediterranean welfare states.
70 Saraceno, The Italian Family: Paradoxes of Privacy, pp. 495, 497.
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Examining the same process from a different angle, other scholars argue
that, while it is routinely assumed that the family loses productive functions
to the market or state with increasing industrialization and the spread of cap-
italist relations, in some regions the opposite occurs. In Italy, both economic
and political forces at times fostered familial involvement in capitalist pro-
duction.71 For my purposes, such arguments are particularly significant, sug-
gesting as they do that state policy helps constitute both the (theoretically
posited) cultural autonomy of the family and a significant part of what is
remembered as the Italian family tradition.
Italy in the World Economy
[M]odernisation has been very rapid in both Italy and Spain. In Italy, it took
place later than in other European countries, between the end of the 1950s and
the beginning of the 1960s.72
Modernization theory, critics note, erroneously tends to conceptualize histor-
ical change as a succession of uniform stages which countries undergo inde-
pendently. In this process, modernity is equated with industrialization and
urbanization (rather than factors such as dominance of wage labour and pro-
duction for profit). In disputing the assumption that modernity is industrial
and tradition rural, historians point to processes ranging from proto-industri-
alization in the countryside, capitalist farming, and rural proletarianization to
the interdependence of unevenly developed regions, regional and interna-
tional flows of workers, and historical reversals such as de-industrialization.
Whether or not they subscribe to modernization theory, commentaries on
Italians in Australia frequently contain parallel assumptions regarding indus-
trialization, urbanization, and modernity. Gucciardo with Bertelli, for exam-
ple, noted that in the 1950s and 1960s most Italian immigrants to Australia
came from peasant rural communities (such as Sicily and Calabria in the
south and Veneto and Friuli in the north) which had not yet been touched by
the growth of industrialization.73 Similarly, in the introduction of an over-
view volume on ethnic family values in Australia, Storer argued that, in
spite of many complexities, there were some common factors affecting
immigrants coming to Australia between 1947 and 1967: they tended to
come from traditional rural-based economies with high emphasis on tradi-
tional social structures. However, as communication, technology and trade
developed in the 1960s, and these countries were drawn into closer contact
71 Goddard, Gender, Family, and Work in Naples, pp. 1213.
72 J. Guerrero and M. Naldini, Is the South so Different? Italian and Spanish Families in Comparative
Perspective in M. Rhodes, ed., Southern European Welfare States: Between Crisis and Reform (Lon-
don: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 4446.
73 T. Gucciardo with L. Bertelli, The Best of Both Worlds: A Study of Second Generation Italo-Austra-
lian (CIRC paper no. 51, Melbourne, Catholic Intercultural Resource Centre, 1987).
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with the industrialised West, so industrialisation began to increase. This led
to increased work for money and greater education for skills. As a result,
[M]arried women began to seek paid employment and a greater variety of
family types emerged.74
Detailed historical work on Italy and Italians, in contrast, suggests that the
region and its people were tightly integrated into the heart of the capitalist
world economy for well over a century. Three themes are particularly signif-
icant. First, even when no factories were built in Italy, Italians provided
essential labour for capitalist development elsewhere. Secondly, factories
were only one form of modern enterprise; they coexisted with, and often
depended on, a range of other forms of production for sale. Finally, what
many commentators see as a timeless backwardness of some regions in Italy
is in fact the partial result of de-industrialization attendant upon the influx of
cheaper goods on the world markets.
For more than 100 years Italy  and its south in particular  had been
one of the largest suppliers of labour power, whether to the Americas, other
European countries, or Australia. The outflow of workers peaked between
1890 and 1914, fell to nineteenth-century levels in the interwar years, and
then grew to a mass movement again after the Second World War. With
Italys entry into the European Economic Community, the south consoli-
dated its place as an important supplier of cheap labour, not only to the north
of Italy, but to other EEC countries.75 It has been estimated that between
1789 and the 1970s, 27 million humble workers left Italy. These people rep-
resented one of the largest migration systems in a very mobile modern
world. The majority of those who left returned; today they are the grandpar-
ents and parents of a sizeable proportion (if not the majority) of the current
nation of Italians.76
In her work on Italians of the world, Gabaccia points out that three nine-
teenth-century developments created massive demand for wage labour: the
emancipation of slaves in the Americas and the associated threat to the
wealth of empires dependent on extracting raw materials from colonial plan-
tations and mines; the emergence of new national states in sparsely popu-
lated regions wrested from indigenous peoples in Canada, South America,
and Australia; and the spread of industrialization from its old centres in
northwestern Europe. Emigrants from Italy were prominent among those
who replaced emancipated African plantation workers in Louisiana and Bra-
zil, populated the plains of Argentina, the United States, and Australia,
mined the iron and coal demanded by new factories, built the canals, rail-
roads, and tunnels to transport them, and worked in the factories themselves.
In the great cities of the United States, Italians paved streets and laid tracks
74 D. Storer, Introduction in D. Storer, ed., Ethnic Family Values in Australia (Sydney: Prentice Hall,
1985), p. 5.
75 M. Martiniello, Italy: Two Perspectives. Racism in Paradise?, Race and Class, vol. 32, no. 3 (1991),
p. 79.
76 Gabaccia, Is Everywhere Nowhere?, pp. 1116, 1120, 1122.
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for street railways. They dug tunnels for railroads, sewers, and subways and
constructed urban water systems. They built bridges, factories, tenements,
department stores, and skyscrapers.77
In most of these labour markets, Italian men were excluded from better-
paid, more skilled and permanent working-class jobs which could support a
family. Such conditions were tolerated, in part, because of the mens particu-
lar understanding of their own economic strategies. Most saw themselves as
itinerant workers whose permanent homes were in Italy. Mens remittances
were crucial parts of widely based family and regional economies; womens
work in agricultural subsistence production underwrote mens departures and
returns, and subsistence production remained an important dimension of fam-
ily economies during Italys mass migrations.78 Italian workers were not only
significant as the hands which powered industrialization and underwrote
development in other parts of the world; the money they sent home repre-
sented a key component of the Italian economy. Goddard notes that, before
the First World War, annual remittances from emigrants were almost twice as
much as the income from tourism, and greater than half of the national debt.79
The second point, already implied in description of the crucial role of Ital-
ian workers in building the very infrastructure of modernity, concerns a cri-
tique of the equation of modernity with large industrial enterprises. Outwork
and decentralized enterprises are often seen as remnants of pre-industrial,
craft production. There is much evidence that, on the contrary, they are
brought into existence as an integral part of some of the most modern
forms of contemporary capitalist production. This point was made forcefully
by scholars such as Kriedte and Samuel with regard to the first phase of
industrialization in England. During this time, different modes of production,
authority relations, and levels of technology not only existed side by side, but
were frequently directly dependent on each other. The most advanced sectors
of the economy were often responsible for much of the massive growth of
contemporary pre-industrial production, for which they often provided
cheaper and more plentiful raw materials, just as, at a later stage of industrial
development, they could lead to its wholesale destruction.80 Samuel, writing
about the later part of nineteenth century, makes the same point: mechaniza-
tion in one department of production was often complemented by an increase
in sweating in others; the growth of large firms by a proliferation of small
producing units; the concentration of work in factories by the spread of out-
work in the home.81
77 D. Gabaccia, Gli italiani nel mondo: Italys Workers Around the World, Magazine of History, vol.
14, no. 1 (1999), pp. 1314.
78 Gabaccia, Is Everywhere Nowhere? p. 1126.
79 Goddard, Gender, Family, and Work in Naples, pp. 25, 33.
80 P. Kriedte, Peasants, Landlords and Merchant Capitalists: Europe and the World Economy, 1500–
1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 144.
81 R. Samuel, Workshop of the World: Steam Power and Hand Technology in Mid-Victorian Britain,
History Workshop, no. 3 (1977), pp. 672.
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Today, some scholars note, decentralized production, outworking, and
development of the informal economy in some regions of Europe can be
explained with reference to parallel processes. Many large employers, con-
fronted with the widespread radicalism of 1968, adopted what are now
described as post-Fordist strategies: they reduced the size of their enter-
prises, or at least avoided further expansion. The decentralizing of produc-
tion allowed for contraction without loss to the enterprise because it was the
subcontractors machines and spaces that were left idle. Many of these firms
had employed a largely female work force; when they restructured, women
lost jobs in factories and took up similar work as statistically invisible out-
workers or as workers in family enterprises in the informal economy. The
economy modernized, but womens participation in the work force fell.82
After two centuries of exporting labour over the globe, Italy has, over the
last three decades, for the first time become a significant destination for
immigrants. A number of commentators have noted that many of these work-
ers play an essential role in the current transformation of Italian society. As
Italian emigrants have done before them, the newcomers facilitate the repro-
duction and growth of non-traditional work relationships. Their irregular
wage employment, irregular self-employment, and coerced work lower
labour costs, increase competition, and provide a source of domestic help for
double-career families. Immigrant networks constantly feed the flux of irreg-
ular workers; the modernization of Italian society becomes embedded, at least
in part, in private initiative and collective support networks of people consid-
ered outsiders.83 The unprecedented conjuncture of immigration and low
fertility rates over the last two decades helped rekindle wide-ranging debates
about the existence or lack of an Italian national identity; many commentators
argue that it helped consolidate a unified notion of Italian character.
Ethnicity, Tradition, and Italian Identity
In Australia my father was a nigger but I was an Australian. I was one of
them but my father wasnt.84
[I]n the fifties I had an Italian boyfriend. It was terrible ... the Aussie guys I
knew, who had never noticed me before, started making sexual passes at me
and yelling sexual abuse at me when we went down the street.... If an Austra-
lian girl went with an Italian boy  you knew she had nothing more to lose.85
82 Goddard, Gender, Family, and Work in Naples, pp. 3543.
83 M. Ambrosini, Convenienze nascoste. Linserimento degli immigrati nelleconomia informale,
Studi di Sociologia, vol. 36, no. 3 (1998), pp. 233257.
84 Recollections of a peasant born in Australia of parents from Friuli, quoted in Holmes, Cultural Disen-
chantments, p. 72.
85 Quoted in J. Martin, Non-English Speaking Migrant Women in Australia in N. Grieve and A. Burns,
Australian Women: New Feminist Perspectives (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 236.
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Discussions about different fertility rates of national groups, I noted earlier,
necessarily cut across definitions of ethnicity, both in the self-identification of
people from particular regions and in the varied reactions to their presence
elsewhere. In making sense of these issues, it is useful to draw on a routine
distinction between primordial views of the nature of ethnic ties and senti-
ments, and notions of ethnicity as a resource to be mobilized. A strong version
of primordialism holds that ethnic ties are universal, natural, and given in all
human association, as much as are speech or kinship. This is a position sup-
ported by many nationalists but few scholars except certain sociobiologists.
The weak version of primordialism claims that ethnic ties and sentiments are
deep-seated and non-rational so far as the participants are concerned; mem-
bers of ethnic communities feel that their community has existed from time
immemorial and that its symbols and traditions possess a deep antiquity
which gives them a unique power. Other theorists (from Marxists to rational
choice and elite competition theorists) tend to view ethnicity as a resource to
be utilized, or an instrument to be employed, by particular groups in pursuit of
further ends, usually of a political or economic nature. For all these theorists,
cultural and symbolic aspects of ethnicity are accessory to fundamental strug-
gles in which the ethnic constituency constitutes a site of mobilization. This
view is held even where due weight is given to the affective aspects of ethnic
ties.86 Theorists who focus on exploitation and racism conceptualize ethnicity
in a similar way: as a set of categories used by dominant social groups to jus-
tify their own privilege and the exclusion of others. Here, research on ethnic-
ity overlaps with recent writings on the making of whiteness. In the work of
a number of scholars, whiteness is considered alongside other notions of eth-
nicity as a particular cultural achievement that carries significant social and
economic benefits.87 Such literature is of particular relevance to discussions
of Italian migration history. In more prosperous regions of Italy, as in other
parts of Europe and its colonies, southern Italian migrants were for a long time
regarded and treated as the Chinese of Europe, dark-skinned people of par-
tial African origin who were not only culturally but racially distinct from their
more civilized neighbours.88
Some of the most influential critics of primordial notions of ethnicity, with
their depiction of traditions as powerful motive forces of deep antiquity, have
been scholars who stress the socially constructed character of invented tra-
86 A. D. Smith, The Politics of Culture: Ethnicity and Nationalism in T. Ingold, ed. Companion Ency-
clopedia of Anthropology (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 707.
87 See, for example, D. R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American
Working Class (London: Verso, 1991); I. Haney-Lopez, White by Law: The Legal Construction of
Race (New York: New York University Press, 1996); M. F. Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color:
European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).
88 D. Gabaccia, The Yellow Peril and the Chinese of Europe: Global Perspectives on Race and
Labor, 18151930 in J. Lucassen and L. Lucassen, eds., Migration, Migration History, History: Old
Paradigms and New Perspectives (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), pp. 177196.
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ditions. Hobsbawm and Ranger, whose widely debated work forms the start-
ing point of much of this approach, define invented traditions as a set of
practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a rit-
ual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of
behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the
past. They are distinctive in that the continuity with a suitable historic past
that they invoke is largely fictitious, sometimes even involving outright forg-
ery. While nationalist texts, speeches, and ceremonies typically emphasize
the ancient origin of the traditions they are upholding, defending, and cele-
brating, many of these institutions and traditions were only recently invented
in a process in which the nationalists themselves played a prominent part.89
The authors note that institutions and practices associated with the national
state are particularly rich in the use of invented traditions. Not only have his-
tories been rewritten and re-imagined to create an appropriate continuity with
ancient precedents; a whole battery of entirely new symbols and devices,
such as national flags and anthems, came into existence as part of national
movements.90 Such imaginings were not confined to those in power; they
were  and are  equally significant to their socialist, feminist, or national-
ist opponents, as well as to ethnic minorities. Together, they have come to
constitute important elements of peoples individual and collective identity.
For the purposes of this discussion, not only is the conceptual language of
tradition well suited to the articulation of individual, ethnic, and national
identities; the demographers favourite cultural tools, the questionnaire and
the interview, lend themselves particularly well to the display of coherent
repertoires of valued cultural attributes. As Pessar puts it:
In a formal research setting, such as one in which surveys or structured inter-
views are administered, an immigrant womans decision to cloak her own and
her familys experiences in a discourse of unity, female sacrifice, and the
womans subordination to the patriarch represents a safe, respectful and
respectable text. As I look back on my own research, this is the female voice
that usually emerged from my own attempts at survey research. By contrast,
my ethnographic collection of discourses that reveal family tensions and strug-
gles emerged far more frequently out of encounters where my own presence
was incidental, that is, not the defining purpose for the ensuing dialogue, or
after many months of participant observation has substantially reduced the ini-
tial formality and suspicion.91
89 See, for example, E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990); E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983).
90 E. Geoff, Nationalism and Social History, Social History, vol. 6, no. 1 (1981), p. 91.
91 P. R. Pessar, Engendering Migration Studies: The Case of New Immigrants in the United States,
American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 42, no. 4 (1999), p. 586.
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Whatever their differences, most authors agree that ethnicity only arises in
particular circumstances. States are deeply implicated in this process. They
sponsor or constitute the focus of nationalism. State institutions define the
allowable formalities of emigration and immigration, play a part in describ-
ing and constituting social categories, help construct social and economic
conditions which migrants leave and encounter as they cross borders. At
times, states structure access to scarce resources so that only sizeable and
relatively coherent groups have access to them. In this way, rival enumera-
tions of the respective sizes of ethnic communities translate into greater or
lesser funding, more or fewer jobs, or a certain number of hours of ethnic
broadcasts. In turn, in making use of resources such as migrant resource cen-
tres, language classes, and health services, ethnic groups gain coherence as
distinct entities.
Recent collaborative work on Italians of the world has provided particu-
larly valuable evidence regarding this process. First, the initial mass waves of
Italian migration in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century predated
the formation of the Italian state. Even after 1861, the existence of any form
of national identity could not be taken for granted. Before 1920, half of Italys
migrants were illiterate; few spoke the Tuscan dialect designated as official
Italian. Indeed, a large proportion of migrants first became Italian only
when they left home: when they encountered government record-keepers,
people from other parts of Italy, or anti-Italian sentiment abroad. Going about
the mundane task of finding work, they responded to other states official
demands for passports and other documents, health inspections, taxes, census
enumerations, military service, departure, naturalization, and loyalty. The cat-
egory Italian, they learned, was the appropriate answer when asked partic-
ular questions about their origins by strangers. Returning home, they found
themselves called americani, germanesi, or australiani by neighbours.92
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the existence or otherwise of a dis-
tinct ethnic identity was closely linked to the history of particular nation-
states. In countries such as Switzerland and Germany, which never acknowl-
edged the significant part that migration played in their modern histories,
granted citizenship to children born on its soil, or allowed for the easy natu-
ralization of foreigners, migrants from Italy became  and remained  Ital-
ians. In France, the arrival of large numbers of immigrants at particular
points in history is acknowledged, but their perceived rapid incorporation
into the nation made most invisible as distinctive social or cultural groups 
not least because statisticians have on principle omitted to count them.93 In
Latin America, Italian immigrants were understood to have contributed to
the development of a culturally hybrid Latin nation. In the United States,
Australia, and Canada, in contrast, the strong emphasis on the Britishness or
92 Gabaccia, Is Everywhere Nowhere?, pp. 1116, 1125.
93 P. Simon, Nationality and Origins in French Statistics: Ambiguous Categories, Population: An
English Selection, vol. 11 (1999), pp. 193220.
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even Englishness of the host nation contributed to the rise and maintenance
of distinct  and publicly enumerated  non-English ethnic identities.
Gabaccia concludes that Italian diasporas (in the plural) might well have
preceded, in time, an Italian nation. In turn, they became the targets of a
whole range of twentieth-century nationalist initiatives as sites of Italian
nation-building.94
There is no space or need to survey Australian work on ethnicity, which
covers the full spectrum of the approaches mentioned here. Rather, I use two
representative works to help conclude my argument. The first, written by one
of a new generation of critical scholars of Italian origin, was originally pub-
lished in a modest but widely used series by the Ecumenical Migration Cen-
tre. In From Coercion to Choice, Pallotta-Chiarolli analysed questionnaires
filled in by 25 school girls from southern Italian background in Adelaide.
Influenced by anti-racist forms of feminist theory, the author contrasted what
she saw as traditional, conservative patriarchal culture of migrant home and
ethnic community with the modern, liberal patriarchal structure of the
wider Anglo-Australian society. While she deconstructed ignorant stereo-
types of southern Italian traditions, took issue with depictions of a recog-
nizable Italian identity in the media and sociological texts, and collected
data on the socioeconomic status of the girls parents, Pallotta-Chiarolli
framed her conclusions in terms of the interplay between two cultures,
between tradition and modernity: [A]lthough generally moving beyond the
traditional beliefs of parents, [the young womens] responses and opinions
display a mixture of conservative and non-conservative trends, a personal
value-system drawing from both traditional and modern influences.95
The author clearly felt that there was an Italian-Australian identity, which
she proudly shared with her respondents. The young women, in turn, all
believed that their values and lifestyles as an adolescent of Italian back-
ground are different from those of Anglo-Australian adolescent females,
even though they did not agree on what the main differences were and what
caused them.96 Work such as this sets out to map the dimensions of what is
intuitively felt to be a vibrant and tangible  albeit changing  ethnic iden-
tity, at times as part of a journey of self-discovery. The meanings of tradi-
tion might be contested, but the term remains significant in making sense of
the present.
In contrast, a number of Marxist scholars assert that many characteristics
routinely attributed to ethnicity in fact constitute a logical response to diffi-
culties of settlement and discriminatory policies of the work place and of
government. In a well-researched book on working-class organization in
post-war heavy industry in Australia, for example, Lever-Tracy and Quinlan
94 Gabaccia, Is Everywhere Nowhere?
95 M. Pallotta-Chiarolli, From Coercion to Choice: Second Generation Women Seeking a Personal
Identity in the Italo-Australian Setting, Journal of Intercultural Studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (1990), p. 52.
96 Santow and Bracher, Traditional Families and Fertility Decline.
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conclude from a comparison of the different industries and unions that the
special characteristics of being an immigrant can be seen to coexist with a
wide array of both union and employer strategies, which leads to a number of
different responses and perspectives among immigrant workers. The distinc-
tive attitudes derived from ethnic cultures (conceived in non-class terms)
play a relatively weak role in explaining this variety. The class relationships
and institutional structures experienced by immigrants ... can be portrayed
more easily as the primary shaping factors.97 In their trenchant critique of
primordialist, psychological explanations of industrial relations, Lever-Tracy
and Quinlan go further than disputing the role of ethnicity. In many ways,
their detailed work also provides evidence for the failure of ethnic forms of
industrial association to emerge.
Today, structural factors, however constituted, figure prominently in both
scholarly and common-sense understanding of falling fertility rates. The
Australian welfare state, labour market, and other social institutions are by
no means family friendly. Yet they are gendered in significantly different
ways from those of Italy. If fertility rates depend, to an appreciable extent,
on social structures, Italian babies in Australia cannot be explained with ref-
erence to a transnational Italian culture. Indeed, a number of Australian
demographers concluded that the fertility of Italian women in Australia does
not differ from others in similar economic circumstances. Can babies, after
all, be deduced from class relations?
Conclusion
Demography, as noted earlier, has a heavy investment in accurate mapping of
the social. While it has made many valuable contributions to the analysis of
contemporary demographic reversals, the discipline seems as far as ever from
explaining the dynamics of fertility change. In their attempts to develop
explanations with greater predictive power, many demographers have partic-
ipated in a recent cultural turn in the social sciences. In these conceptual
endeavours, the twin themes of tradition and modernity play a significant
role. While modernization theory is widely acknowledged to be inadequate
as a shorthand explanation of contemporary demographic trends, its underly-
ing assumptions continue to inform alternative explanations. I argue that
social historians provide a more accurate rendering of the past. Attentive to
the specificity and diversity of social structures, as well as to the internal
rationality of peoples cultures, such explanations better meet Tippss cri-
terion of empirical accuracy. Does this mean that social historians provide a
superior form of population thinking?
One of the most powerful critiques of early formulations of the concept of
invented tradition had to do with historical accuracy. The critics did not
97 C. Lever-Tracy and M. Quinlan, A Divided Working Class: Ethnic Segmentation and Industrial Con-
flict in Australia (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988), p. 316.
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question the usefulness of various projects of uncovering the true genesis
of various traditions, but objected to an assumed linkage between veracity
and social efficacy. What matters, they argued, is not so much whether a par-
ticular rendering of tradition and national heritage is more or less accurate,
but the process whereby certain beliefs and understandings become part of
common sense, of everyday culture, of an orientation to social action. Cul-
tural traditions become bases for nationalism  or ethnic identity  when
they effectively constitute historical memory, when they inculcate it as
habitus or as prejudice, not when (or because) their claims relate to an
accurate rendering of social history.98
Accuracy is less than helpful to exasperated parents using tradition as a
strategic resource in disciplining children and in establishing respect and
security in a new land. The vague but powerful sense of Italianness research-
ers such as Pallotta-Chiarolli share with their respondents is no less real if
the people in question get their elementary historical facts hopelessly mud-
dled. Conversely, the strategic significance of tradition in orientation to
social action makes it the explicit object of everyday cultural contestation,
and at times of social movements. In one of her commentaries on the current
state of feminist theory in Italy, for example, Passerini contrasts Mediterra-
nean and northern archetypes of motherhood: one, the mythical image of the
omnipotent Great Mother, capable of giving life as well as of taking it away,
a devouring and terrifying type of motherhood; the other, to which it has
often been counterposed, the Northern emancipated woman, free of tradi-
tional chains but also free of the charms of traditional femininity. She argues
that Italian feminists of the 1970s and early 1980s lived through a profound
rebellion against the traditional ideas of the mother and rejected them, often
rejecting motherhood themselves altogether or leaving it until later in life.99
The debate over the social value of motherhood that Italian feminists had at
the end of the nineteenth century, Passerini concludes, should be reopened to
forge a new model of womanhood. It is precisely this general debate that
Australian feminists from Italian background struggle with when they write
about coercion and choice or the best of both worlds.
In many ways, it does not really matter whether the traditions that make
up ethnic consciousness are historically accurate. Accuracy does matter,
however, when it comes to the predictive capacity of social theory. It is more
essential still for the planning capacity of state instrumentalities. As other
contributors to this collection point out, the social has recently been con-
tested on a number of political and conceptual fronts. In many communities,
demographers have helped make visible another fundamental challenge: the
fall of fertility rates far below the level of social reproduction. In their
attempts to comprehend more precisely what many see as a profound social
98 C. Calhoun, Nationalism and Ethnicity, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 19 (1993), p. 222.
99 L. Passerini, The Interpretation of Democracy in the Italian Womens Movement of the 1970s and
1980s, Women’s Studies International Forum, vol. 17, nos. 23 (1994), p. 237.
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pathology, demographers and others have undermined some of the concep-
tual foundations of their subject. Insofar as they relied on modernization the-
ory, studies of demographic transitions failed to confirm many of the
working hypotheses around which they were built. At the same time, in con-
ducting detailed studies of specific communities, anthropologists, historians,
and other scholars provide what are arguably more empirically accurate
explanations of procreative behaviour  ones based on discontinuities,
alternative strategies, mutual dependencies and exploitations, different ratio-
nalities and traditions, cultures and economies. Such theoretical decon-
structions of modernity and tradition stand alongside more widely based
reappraisals of sex and gender relations. These debates and fights, heart-
aches and illuminations, sullen standoffs and loving accommodations,
involving powerful social movements and profound questions of self-iden-
tity, spanning some of the most fundamental relations between men and
women and the young and the old, are not likely to be resolved in a hurry.
While they last, Foucauldian visions of a perfectly comprehended social will
have to wait.
